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Property as an Instrument of Power
in Nicaragua
MARIO MARTINEZ*
To better understand the subject of property in Nicaragua, it is nec-
essary to review recent history.
1.1. SOMOZA PERIOD
The Somoza period was one of change with respect to the tradi-
tional ownership of property.1 Property owners began to modernize
their forms of ownership. Communal ownership was established,
wherein individual land and money, which was historically used to cre-
ate financial centers for small producers and commercial communities
for the local and export markets, was reallocated with the goal of creat-
ing large agricultural entities, for example, coffee and cotton plantations.
These changes were brought about through several measures
including:
a.a. Expropriation from economically weak sectors.
a.b. Expropriation of land which belonged to indigent
communities.
a.c. Expropriation of land belonging to rural farmers and work-
ers, who had no deeds to the land.
a.d. Small producers with title to their land were brought before
the authorities.
All of these sectors were relieved of their properties, to be used for
the cotton, coffee and banana plantations. The expropriated owners were
forced by the military to move to zones in the jungle where there were
no basic services, e.g. potable drinking water, electricity, telephone, and
very little means with which to begin working the land, which was dif-
ferent from any they had worked before, as it was muddy and wet.
Together with these changes, new groups began to form, which
were not necessarily agricultural in nature. These groups would central-
ize the money generated by the plantation ("hacienda") owners, which
included rent from urban properties. These groups eventually became
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1. "Traditional ownership," in this context, the ownership of land and properties made useful
and productive without major complexity in production and distribution, and without need of tools
such as banks and financing.
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the banks and financial institutions which assisted the economic invest-
ments of the hacienda owners.
In urban areas, for example, landlords become less common,
replaced by urban-planning companies, which focused their efforts on
middle and high income areas. In low income areas, the companies
would sell property, without deeds, to the emigrating farmers which
arrived in the cities. When the farmers could not make the payments,
they would be evicted, only to be replaced by another farmer. This
resulted in a chain of property "owners" without any deeds who, as a
result, had no claim on their property. For example, an owner of a lot
who paid a fixed amount for five years or more and was able to con-
struct a house on the property, but missed one payment, could be evicted
and lose not only the lot, but the house as well. That lot, along with the
house, would be resold. This process generated huge returns for the
urbanization companies and allowed them to maintain ownership of
their properties.
1.2 PROPERTY WAS CONCENTRATED IN Two GROUPS
The first group was the historical family descended from the Span-
ish and European, which owned their property and investments since the
colonization period, and have passed it down from generation to genera-
tion, e.g. Pellas, Chamorro, McGregor, etc..
The second group was the military sector, the Somoza family, and
its supporters. This group eventually obtained economic, political and
military power in Nicaragua, preventing other groups' participation in
the economic as well as the political sector.
By 1979, ownership of property had changed considerably and the
influence of the Somoza sector was so great that the unease of the eco-
nomic and social sectors began to clearly manifest itself. Insurrections
were started by the Sandinistas and reactionary guerillas came forth.
Additionally, the Catholic Church began demanding an equitable distri-
bution of wealth. These groups, traditional, civil organizations and popu-
lar groups2 united in the guerilla attack as the only way to topple the
Somoza regime. The traditional sector had been severely affected by the
economic voracity of the Somoza regime. As a result, even though some
thought and others suspected, that the guerilla movement was founded in
Marxist philosophy, the traditional sector also supported the efforts to
destroy the regime. They believed that, in Nicaragua, the redistribution
of property would not be through Socialist measures.
2. Popular Groups: workers, farmers, civil servants, domestic workers, the unemployed, etc.
[Vol. 53:907
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1.3 THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE: THE SANDINISTA PERIOD
The Sandinista revolution destroyed all the power structures previ-
ously in existence. Property ownership went from one where property
ownership was dominated by two large sectors, the Somoza and the
traditional, to a centralized state of ownership, which would nationalize
all businesses, from agricultural to industrial.
With the dismantling of the National Guard of Somoza's regime
and the new Sandinista military control, modifications were made to
gain political control. With both of these in hand, new measures were
implemented: more sectors would be confiscated, with several groups
demanding the arrests of the Somoza family and supporters of his gov-
ernment. The Sandinistas confiscated huge lots of property in the rural
areas which weren't being farmed, and in the urban areas, apartment
buildings and residential areas, including empty lots, were confiscated as
well. Shortly thereafter, a state bank system was established as the only
banking system in the country.
Agricultural reforms followed, characterized by redistribution of
land, not with the goal of creating societies of individual ownership, but
instead with the goal of creating cooperatives, where technical and
financial assistance could be funneled. The thought of granting individ-
ual deeds could stop the fundamental property goal of the Sandinistas,
which was to establish a Socialist state. These measures exemplified the
fastest way to transfer property from individual ownership to state own-
ership, in the creation of Area Propiedad del Pueblo ("APP" or Land
Owned by the State.")
With the Contras uprising, other measures involving property were
implemented, for example, businesses lost their capital and properties
were abandoned. The goal of these measures was to acquire all property
belonging to those who did not support the Sandinista government. To
do so, the Sandinistas eliminated as much capital as possible, while
property owners who feared military rule fled the country, abandoning
their homes, or leaving them with a friend or employee. The Sandinista
government also took political measures against the business sector,
which remained in Nicaragua as the only opposition to their govern-
ment. These measures included confiscation of the business' property,
and in some cases, incarcerating their directors.
The Sandinista period was one during which a limited number of
deeds were being granted in rural areas: the farmers and cooperative
members owned the property without deeds. At the same time, in the
urban areas, the occupants of low-income apartments, lots and residen-
tial areas, occupied the properties, but never held title to them. Clearly,
the objective of the Sandinista government was not to create new prop-
19991
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erty owners, but instead to create new tenants and people to work the
land, with the sole property owner being the State. During this period, an
attempt to create a Socialist slate was made by establishing the requisite
political and social bases, but no changes were made to the judicial sys-
tem, which would have legalized many of the atrocities committed dur-
ing that period.
1.4 THE BEGINNING OF CONFLICT: THE VIOLETA CHAMORRO PERIOD
Upon being elected, Violeta Chamorro addressed anew the problem
of property, which by now had become much more complicated. The
new government was dealing with a "Sistema Judicial" ("Judicial Sys-
tem") or "CADUCO" which was unable to legally resolve the property
situation. This group began to negotiate with Chamorro's First Gover-
nor, and allegedly Sandinista representatives, in an attempt to resolve the
property situation through political means, without even attempting to
make changes in the judicial system.
The Chamorro government began privatizing state-owned busi-
nesses and attempted to return those properties previously confiscated
by the Sandinistas, with the exception of those owned by the Somoza
family, members of the military during his regime and his supporters. At
that time, the popular sector began to organize to defend their rights to
property. This was manifested in a petition by factory workers and busi-
nesses, requesting 25% ownership in these properties, which at that time
still belonged to the State.
In the case of small properties like houses and small business the
problem was much more difficult. The claims received by the tribunals
were nearly impossible to process and the judicial system so slow and
obsolete, that it was estimated it would take fifteen years to resolve the
problem.3
1.5 LIBERAL GOVERNMENT: ARNOLDO ALEMAN
With the inception of the Aleman government, the situation was
rendered yet more tense, resulting in a round of negotiations with the
Sandinistas to create a new law known in the national political scene as
"The Final Point Law". This law, while pretending to be a resolution of
the problem, is rather a continuation of a never ending problem that
leaves unprotected the popular sector, which had benefited from the
agricultural and urban reforms, and hurts small property owners as well.
The grand beneficiaries of this law would be: 1) the Sandinistas,
3. See Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Disputes of Property in Nicaragua
(March 15, 1995) (on file with The Carter Center, Atlanta, Ga.)
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who were able to legitimize their ownership of property; 2) the military
and police; 3) the Sandinista administration and its members; and, 4)
the. new economic group which supported the new liberal government.
This new group sought to consolidate itself to confront the Sandinistas
and the traditional sector.
To better to understand this "Final Point Law" I have chosen to
include small fragments of the same. These are parts of a critique made
by the magazine Envio from the Central American University, UCA.
"Agricultural reform deeds are unprotected in urban areas of Mana-
gua and other cities. This article estimates that agricultural reform deeds
issued within the urban limits of Managua, established during the zoning
process in 1982, will be declared null. These deeds will be void and their
registration inscription will be canceled. It is assumed that in those
cases, the INRA ("Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria") (National
Institute of Agricultural Reform") will reassign the occupants of those
properties other lands so they can continue their productive activities...
All of these lands have increased in value, but the person(s) responsible
for that increase in value over the years will not benefit from that
increase and will be sent to remote lands, without the necessary condi-
tions for production or commercialization of the property. This measure
is similar to that which the Somoza government used when it displaced
thousands of farmers into the jungles." Additionally, urban sectors in the
same area will suffer. "Article 93 of the new law states that occupants of
residential housing which have been consolidated since 1994, even if
they were permanently placed, will be subject to decisions made by the
authorities responsible for addressing urban issues, and can be relocated,
when the urban areas in question which the current occupants reside in
are affected by the natural urban development of the city."4
The new law seemingly resolves a problem, even if momentarily,
but in reality it benefits the groups in power. This law, which suppos-
edly is the end-all of a problem, actually fertilizes a problem even more
profound - just distribution of property among all social groups in Nic-
aragua. I believe that instead of a "final solution" it is the beginning of a
new struggle - now with other "haves" and the same "have nots".
1.6 CONCLUSION
The problem of property in Nicaragua is very complex and no gov-
ernment has really had the political will to establish the necessary bases
to start a true exchange in terms of possession of the land and ownership
4. The Problems of Property and Its Owners, INrvo (Central American University, UCA),
Oct. 1997.
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of the property. The solutions proffered by the Sandinista, Chamorro and
Aleman governments have been superficial and incapable of reaching
the crux of the problem. These solutions can be characterized as
attempts to solve crises between centers of power which seek more
power: control over new areas of property, because these centers under-
stand that if they don't obtain such power, they will lose political control
as well. On the other hand, the popular class and its civil organizations
continue to be dominated, subordinate in a country where the wealth is
concentrated in few hands with each passing day, and the dispossessed
sectors" opportunities become fewer and fewer.
